The occupation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine brought minority issues to the top of the Baltic security agenda. Although experts estimate that a separatist scenario for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is not probable, the issue of national minorities has already been included into the security concept as a potential source of danger to stability and national identity. While there is need to analyze political risks in the Baltics, the concept of securitization will be applied to the topic of national minorities. This paper addresses the problem of national minorities' political integration and loyalty to the state. For the empirical analysis, the paper will use secondary data of surveys conducted in 2014-2017, exposing opinions and beliefs of minorities in the Baltic States referring to their domestic and foreign policies, NATO, Ukrainian crisis and relations with Russia. As a result, the concluding suggestion is made that more attention should be paid to political cohesion and minority policy management: 1) to optimize the minority development; 2) to predict potential risks in the region, and 3) to prevent further threats from Russia.
INTRODUCTION
The Baltic States perceive themselves as pressured by Russia on their political system, economic, social and cultural cohesion as well as national identity. While Estonia perceives itself as prepared enough for the contemporary challenges, the Lithuanian government realizes its security primarily in military terms due to proximity of militarized Kaliningrad and the Suwalki Gap. Latvia is something inbetween, recognizing Russia's influence on its economy, energy and information system, and considering the possibility of Russian troops in Latvia as well as separatist movements, terrorist attacks and cyber-threats. It is believed Russia may also try to discredit the Baltic States in the international arena by propaganda and disinformation.
For more than 70 years Moscow's strategic aim towards the Baltic States has been to intimidate and undermine their national cohesion. 1 In addition to traditional economic pressure and military policy, Russia also uses the media to influence Russian-speakers in the Baltic States. As a result, a historical, cultural and linguistic transnational community of 'русский мир' (Russkij Mir, 'Russian World') has been formed. 2 The idea serves as a justification for Russia's engagement in post-Soviet area; it is the reason for reconnecting the Soviet past with the current situation of Russian diaspora and it is a crucial instrument for articulating Russia's interests in the international arena. In fact the idea of protecting the rights of Russian-speakers in the Baltic States as articulated by Russia in the international arena is a subtle form of discrediting the governments of the Baltic States. Interestingly, Russian media tends to highlight that in Lithuania not only the rights of Russians, but also the rights of the Polish community are being violated.
1 Glen E. Howard, "Latvia-US Relations and the Changing Security Environment in the Baltic": 100 when objects start to be defined as a threat and are distinguished from the normal political run, the process of "securitization" starts. Paul Roe compares the process to an act of "call and response" when an actor recognizes that something is a matter of "security", and the audience may accept or reject it. When the call is accepted the securitization process starts. 4 In contrast, "desecuritization" means that people think of the issue in terms of fairness rather than threat.
In Baltic and Russian studies, Žaneta conclusions suggest that more attention should be paid to political cohesion and the minority policy management in particular: 1) to optimize the minority development;
2) to predict potential risks in the region, and 3) to prevent further threats from Russia. 11 . There are fewer Russians in Lithuania. They reside mostly in Vilnius, Klaipeda, and Visaginas (12%, 20% and 50% respectively). The Polish minority is the largest ethnic minority in Lithuania, concentrated in the Vilnius Region.
NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE BALTIC STATES
Especially large Polish communities are found in Šalčininkai region (almost 80%). 
National minorities in the Baltic
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Estonian national identity since the time of independence has been framed as being constantly threatened by the Russian-speaking residents as well as the Russian state, although the character of the threat has changed from a military to a cultural one. 13 While Latvia insisted more on assimilative language policy by reducing Russian language in public space and limiting Russian schools, 14 Estonian integration policies have proceeded more smoothly. 15 Since the beginning of the 2000s, when the first integration strategy was adopted, integration discourse is described as a process of socialization including "the adaptation of different ethnic minority cultures existing in Estonia, not their assimilation into (ethnic) Estonian culture." 16 
SECURITY THREATS AND MINORITY SECURITIZATION AFTER THE
CRIMEA ANNEXATION
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia perceive their security threats differently.
According to the results of the "Spinter tyrimai" survey in Lithuania in 2014, 55% of respondents (regardless of nationality) claimed that they are in danger from Russia. 20 Above all, Russia is seen as the most influential actor to influence security in the region. It has been developing a broad spectrum of military and economic methods to legitimize Russia's interests in post-Soviet spaces. Russia has exerted its influence in each state through Russian-language media imported from Russia.
Russian-based organized crime (RBOC) is seen as being located in Latvia. 21 Further,
Russia has extended various antidiplomatic instruments of influence in the Baltic
States to construct a negative image of the Baltic States, affect the Baltic States' domestic policies, and subtly discredit their governments. Despite that, governments' mistrust of minorities has remained high.
It seems the process of minorities securitization is related to identity building in the Baltic States, which has been shaped in opposition to the former Soviet/Russian ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 2 2017
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Russia supports cooperation between Polish and Russian communities and unfairly blames Lithuania for violating the rights of ethnic communities. 35 
WHAT DO THE SURVEYS SHOW?
In this section the discussion of minorities' opinions and beliefs as well as their attachment to the Baltic States is presented.
Broad surveys from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia regarding minorities'
identification and state loyalty in the aftermath of the Crimea annexation reveal that a significant majority of the minority communities perceive themselves to belong to the state where they reside. In general, they recognize themselves as patriots and are proud to be citizens of the Baltic States. In case of military aggression they claim to support the state authority, although a few of them would prefer to leave the country following a hostile forces attack. It is assumed that the longer the minority representatives reside in the republic, the more likely they are to consider themselves citizens or even as representatives of the titular nation. For example, in Latvia the strongest patriotic feeling was demonstrated by old generations of minority residents. 36 Unsurprisingly, the division of support of NATO was clear along linguistic lines.
In Latvia 45% residents believe NATO guarantee Latvian integrity and state security while 38% was opposed to it. According to the survey 60% of those who support the allied forces are ethnic Latvians while only 23% Russian-speakers support it. In the same survey around 60% of Russian-speaking population in Latvia are against NATO. 37 Similarly, the results of a recent survey conducted by the polling firm Turuuuringute AS commissioned by the Estonian Ministry of Defence show that while nearly 90% of the country's Estonian-speaking residents support the presence of NATO forces in Estonia, more than half of its Russian-speakers are opposed to it.
Similarly, while 53% of ethnic Estonian indicated that they believed NATO would render direct military assistance in case Estonia were in danger, just 19% of Russianspeaking respondents agreed to it. Furthermore, minorities' opinions and beliefs related to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis should be perceived through the prism of the integration problems and social cohesion. A few polls revealed that people in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia feel insecure in areas such as material and financial situation, job security, and health security more than in area of the country's stability and national security. 49 While numerous minority members work as blue collar workers due to the lack of high language proficiency, they are afraid of losing jobs as a consequence of geopolitical and economic risks in the Baltic region. Minority communities with low socioeconomic conditions are much more vulnerable to propaganda and populist ideology, and some may feel being discriminated against in their host state due to their ethnicity. 
